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c h i l d for considerat ion of value , admissible as non-hearsay or hearsay 
excepted in Utah R. Evid. 803, and not prejudic ia l or confusing? 
3 . Was the evidence s u f f i c i e n t to support the j u r y f s verdic t 
of g u i l t y where attempting t o sa l e a ch i ld was the s tatutory equivalent 
of s e l l i n g a ch i ld under Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-203 and there was 
evidence defendant took a substant ia l s tep strongly corroborating her 
intent to commit the offense? 
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i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of counsel denied her a f a i r t r i a l where defense 
counsel1 s performance at t r i a l was not demonstratably d e f i c i e n t ? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaint i f f /Respondent , : Case No. 20954 
- v - : 
JULIE WARREN VERDE, t Pr ior i ty No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Defendant, J u l i e Warren Verde, was charged with sa l e of 
a c h i l d , a third degree fe lony, in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-7-203 (1978) . 
Defendant was convicted of a sa l e of a ch i ld , in a jury 
t r i a l held June 5 and 6, 1985, i n the Third Judic ia l D i s t r i c t 
Court, in and for S a l t Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, pres iding. Defendant was sentenced by 
Judge Wilkinson on September 5 , 1985, to the indeterminate 
sentence of up t o f i v e years in prison and a $5,000.00 f ine and 
placed on probation on condit ion she serve nine months in the 
county j a i l (90-day reduction i f defendant paid $2,500.00 f ine 
and performed 450 hours community s e r v i c e ) . On November 18, 
1985, defendant's sentence was modified t o a j a i l term of three 
months. The sentence has been stayed pending t h i s appeal* 
The v ic t im, Tammy Watson, f i r s t met the defendant, 
J u l i e Warren Verde, on June 25, 1984 when defendant came to see 
Dr. Ray Barton concerning treatment for weight reduction (Tr. 
10) • Mrs. Watson worked as a medical a s s i s t a n t in Dr. Barton1 s 
o f f i c e (Tr. 9 , 65) and was pregnant a t the time (Tr. 12)
 f but 
subsequently suffered a miscarriage on September 17 , 1984 (Tr. 
1 2 ) . 
From June, 1984 to January, 1985, defendant v i s i t e d Dr. 
Barton's o f f i c e weekly or bi-weekly and received i n j e c t i o n s of 
vitamin B-l and phosphate (Tr. 18 , 42 -43 , 6 1 ) . The phosphate 
shots cost $6 .00 , and the vitamin B-l shots cost $8.50 for a b i -
weekly dose, $6.00 for a weekly dose (Tr. 15 , 4 3 , 7 3 ) . 
Four days after Mrs. Watson's miscarriage, the 
defendant came in for her check-up and shots (Tr. 1 2 - 1 3 ) . She 
learned of Mrs. Watson's miscarriage and asked her i f she was 
in teres ted in a private adoption (Tr. 1 3 , 6 8 ) . Defendant t o l d 
Mrs. Watson she worked for an at torney, and together they were 
s e t t i n g up a pract ice for arranging adoptions (Tr. 1 3 ) . She gave 
Mrs. Watson her phone number and asked her t o c a l l that evening 
(Tr. 1 3 ) . 
Mrs. Watson discussed the p o s s i b i l i t y of adopting with 
her husband that night and c a l l e d defendant t o t e l l her they were 
w i l l i n g t o adopt (Tr. 1 3 - 1 4 ) . Defendant said she knew of a g i r l 
due to de l i ver in December, 19 84 whose baby the Watsons would get 
for adoption (Tr. 1 4 ) . Again she said she worked for an attorney 
and named him as Steve Kuhnhausen (Tr. 1 4 ) . Defendant a l s o t o l d 
Mrs. Watson she would have to pay medical expenses and lawyer 's 
f e e s of approximately $2,500.00 (Tr. 14 -15) . Defendant a l so 
indicated she would be rece iv ing a portion of the l e g a l f ee s for 
her work s e t t i n g up the adoption (Tr. 1 5 ) . 
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Through the period from September 21, 1984 to January 
19 85, the defendant and Mrs. Watson had almost nightly contact 
concerning the adoption (Tr. 18-19, 246), during which fees were 
discussed (Tr. 41). The defendant steadily increased the amount 
for fees (Tr. 42) , from $2/500.00 in the beginning (Tr. 15, 41) 
to $3,000.00 (Tr. 40-41) and finally to $5,000.00 (Tr. 42, 101, 
147) . In October, defendant told Mrs. Watson that she would have 
to have some things to prepare for the arrival of the baby (Tr. 
19, 25), which precipitated several purchases, including 
clothing, wallpaper, toys, a crib, and a car seat (Tr. 19, 22-
26). Mrs. Watson also gave notice to her employer that she would 
be quitting when the baby came (Tr. 20). 
Late in October, defendant said she would need to come 
to the Watson home for a "home study" to see if the Watson1s were 
prepared for the child (Tr. 20). This home study was done 
sometime in November (Tr. 20), at which time, the defendant 
showed Mrs. Watson a photograph of a girl and boy and told her 
the girl was the mother of the baby they would be adopting (Tr. 
21). Again, legal and medical fees were discussed. The figure 
was approximately $3,000.00 (Tr. 40-41). 
Near the end of November, the defendant fabricated a 
letter (Tr. 223-224) which she represented to the victim was from 
"Sharon," the girl purportedly giving her child to the Watsons 
(Tr. 27). The defendant also told Mrs. Watson that Sharon had 
had an ultrasound test which indicated the baby was a girl (Tr. 
30-31). This information perpetuated further purchases for the 
child (Tr. 31). 
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From October through January, Mrs. Watson agreed t o and 
did i n fac t pay for defendant's i n j e c t i o n s in exchange for a 
reduction in l ega l f ees for the adoption (Tr. 15 , 43 -44 , 103-104, 
170) . The shots Mrs. Watson paid for t o t a l l e d between $80.00 t o 
$90.00 (Tr. 6 2 ) . 
On January 4 , 1985, the defendant contacted Mr. Watson 
about another c h i l d , a 13-month old g i r l whose mother wanted to 
g ive her up for adoption (Tr. 47-49, 2 3 0 ) . She to ld Mr. Watson 
the mother was i n the hospi ta l for drug abuse (Tr. 4 8 ) , and 
brought the c h i l d , Emlee, to the Watson home for a " tr ia l period" 
(Tr. 4 8 ) . At the time, Emlee was sick (Tr. 4 9 ) . Soon a f t e r , 
defendant c a l l e d t o see i f Mrs. Watson wanted t o adopt Emlee (Tr. 
50) . Mrs. Watson thereaf ter made several purchases for Emlee 
(Tr. 24 , 3 3 - 3 8 ) . At t h i s point , Mrs. Watson and her family 
members be l ieved they were g e t t i n g both Emlee and a newborn t o 
adopt (Tr. 137-38) . 
Defendant picked up Emlee on January 6th , saying her 
mother wanted to see her one l a s t time (Tr. 51) . Mrs. Watson 
became concerned when the defendant did not bring Emlee back. 
F ina l l y , the defendant contacted Mrs. Watson and said the c h i l d 
was in the Univers i ty of Utah Hospital for treatment and that she 
would be returned t o the Watsons (Tr. 52-53) . 
On January 7th , Mrs. Watson met the defendant a t 
defendant's request in a Fred Meyer parking l o t (Tr. 53 ) . At 
t h i s t ime, defendant gave Emlee to Watson (Tr. 53) and asked her 
for gas money to pay for travel c o s t s in de l i ver ing Emlee. Mrs. 
Watson gave hec $5.00 (Tr. 5 3 - 5 4 ) . 
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Defendant took Emlee again on January 13th, on the 
premise she was meeting with the judge and lawyers t o f i n a l i z e 
the adoption and t o show them how Emlee1 s condit ion had improved 
(Tr. 56) . She said the ch i ld would be returned t o the Watsons to 
adopt on January 14th (Tr. 56) and t o have $500.00 advance 
payment ready to cover the paperwork (Tr. 105) . 
When defendant did not return Emlee to Mrs. Watson on 
January 14th as planned, Mrs. Watson became concerned and talked 
with the defendant (Tr. 5 6 ) . Mrs. Watson f e l t the defendant was 
making excuses for not de l iver ing the baby t o her (Tr. 56); so 
she checked on the representions defendant had made (Tr. 56, 5 7 ) , 
and subsequently ca l l ed the po l ice (Tr. 56, 57, 144) . 
Detect ive Pat Smith and Sargeant Gale McCurdy came to 
Mrs. Watson's home t o i n v e s t i g a t e the s i tua t ion (Tr. 57, 144-45) 
and were a l so there l i s t e n i n g on a speaker recorder attached t o 
the phone during several of Mrs. Watson's conversations with 
defendant (Tr. 57, 1 4 6 ) . After Mrs. Watson contacted the p o l i c e , 
the p a r t i e s had further contact concerning the Watsons1 
a c q u i s i t i o n of Emlee (Tr. 5 8 ) . 
Sometime between January 14 and 22, defendant c a l l e d 
Mrs. Watson and t o l d her Emlee1 s mother had consented t o the 
adoption (Tr. 5 8 ) . Defendant made another c a l l to Mrs. Watson on 
January 31st t o arrange another meeting a t 9:00 a.m. in the Fred 
Meyer parking l o t (Tr. 59, 9 5 ) . In a phone conversation at about 
t h i s time, she t o l d Mrs. Watson not to say anything about the 
$5,000.00 in f ees (Tr. 101 , 147 ) . 
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Mrs. Watson, Mrs. Leonard and her grandaughter, met the 
defendant on February 1 s t as planned (Tr. 6 0 ) . Sargeant McCurdy 
and Detec t ive Smith observed the transact ion between Watson and 
the defendant (Tr. 60 , 149-150) . Defendant gave Emlee t o Mrs. 
Watson and to ld her Emlee was hers (Tr. 6 0 ) . Mrs. Watson l e f t 
the Fred Meyer parking l o t and drove to Dr. Barton's o f f i c e , 
where she met the po l ice who took the ch i ld (Tr. 6 1 ) . 
As the defendant drove away, the two o f f i c e r s stopped 
her (Tr. 150) and questioned her as t o who Emlee1s mother was 
(Tr. 150-51) . The defendant f i r s t gave the name of June Mclntyre 
in Ogden (Tr. 150 -52 ) . The o f f i c e r s then read her the Hixsada 
warning (Tr. 152-53) . She subsequently gave them the correct 
name of the c h i l d ' s mother, June Burkhardt (Tr. 153 ) , to ld them 
Emlee was not up for adoption (Tr. 153) , and that she wanted t o 
s t a r t an agency but had only talked t o an attorney, Mr. 
Kuhnhausen, once (Tr. 153-54) . 
Defendant t e s t i f i e d in her own defense. She denied 
quoting any s p e c i f i c amount for medical expenses (Tr. 248) , but 
did admit she had quoted l e g a l fees of $500.00 (Tr. 223) and 
discussed hospi ta l expenses (Tr 104) . She further claims she did 
not ask for money for adoption s e r v i c e s (Tr. 1 0 4 ) . During the 
months of October, 1984 through January, 1985, Mrs. Watson paid 
for defendant's vitamin B-l i n j e c t i o n s (Tr. 9 8 ) . Defendant 
claims there was no agreement Mrs. Watson would pay for these 
shots in exchange for a reduction in the l ega l f ees (Tr. 2 4 0 ) . 
She says Mrs. Watson t o l d her the shots were "on the house." 
(Tr. 59.) However, Dr. Barton t e s t i f i e d only he could authorize 
free treatment (Tr. 170) . 
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Defendant further t e s t i f i e d tha t Sharon, the g i r l 
al legedly placing her chi ld with the Watsons, changed her mind 
(Tr. 223) , and tha t she t r i e d t o find another g i r l wi l l ing t o 
give up her chi ld for adoption (Tr. 223-24). She cal led Lori 
Warner, her s i s t e r , as a witness t o corroborate t h i s testimony 
(Tr. 208-09). 
Defendant s ta ted t h a t she asked Mrs. Watson t o care for 
Emlee on January 4th because both Emlee1s mother and she were too 
i l l to care for her (Tr. 227) . She further s ta ted tha t she took 
Emlee back to Mrs. Watson on January 7th because Mrs. Burkhardt 
was s t i l l too sick t o care for her herself (Tr. 230). Defendant 
admitted, however, tha t after she delivered Emlee to Mrs. Watson 
the second time, she told Mrs. Watson tha t Emlee was ava i lab le 
for adoption (Tr. 230-31). 
On February 1, defendant asked Mrs. Burkhardt if she 
could take Emlee to an abort ion ta lk she was giving (Tr. 185-86, 
265) which, by her own admission was a l i e (Tr. 265). The 
defendant t e s t i f i e d that on February 1s t , she to ld Mrs. Watson 
she could have Emlee on a v i s i t a t i o n bas is and t o have her back 
a t 5:00 p.m. that day. 
Defendant did not ca l l any witnesses to corroborate her 
claim tha t the fees discussed were for legal and medical 
expenses. 
Defendant's claim tha t the s ta tu tory exceptions were 
e s sen t i a l elements of the crime of sale of a chi ld requir ing a 
jury ins t ruc t ion i s not supported by any authori ty or legal 
- 7 -
a n a l y s i s and was not adequately preserved below for review on 
appeal. Exis t ing authority supports the S t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n that 
exceptions and provisos are not e s s e n t i a l elements of a crime. 
Therefore, i t was not p la in error for the court not t o in s t ruc t 
concerning them. 
The t r i a l court properly admitted evidence of the 
v i c t i m ' s s t a t e of mind because i t was relevant t o e s t a b l i s h the 
defendant's in tent t o s e l l a ch i ld for value . Defendant's claim 
that Mrs. Watson's out -of -court statements to Tania Leonard and 
Ronda Colvin was inadmissible hearsay was not preserved in the 
t r i a l court below for appeal. The statements were not hearsay, 
as they were not offered for the truth of the ir content , but t o 
e s t a b l i s h the v i c t i m ' s s ta te of mind. They were a l s o admissible 
as non-hearsay under the prior cons i s tent statements ru le , Utah 
R. Evid. 801(d) (1 ) (B) . Assuming they were hearsay, they would 
s t i l l be admissible under at l e a s t two except ions t o the hearsay 
ru l e , Utah R. Evid. 803(1) and (3 ) . 
Out-of-court statements made by representat ives of the 
Utah State Hospi ta l , Socia l Serv ices and the ch i ldren ' s center 
indicat ing defendant had made f a l s e representat ions t o the 
v ic t im, Mrs. Watson, were hearsay, but the ir admission was 
harmless error under the circumstances of t h i s case , where the 
State offered the v i c t i m ' s testimony that she had found the 
defendant's representat ions f a l s e and defendant herse l f 
e s t a b l i s h e d the same f a c t s in her testimony. Moreover, the 
defendant f a i l e d t o object t o these statements; there fore , she 
cannot chal lenge on these grounds on appeal. Defendant further 
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f a i l e d t o show that the probative value of evidence of the 
v i c t i m ' s s ta te of mind was subs tant ia l l y outweighed by i t s 
prejudice t o the defendant. 
F ina l ly , the defendant f a i l e d t o show that her defense 
counsel rendered a demonstrably d e f i c i e n t performance a t t r i a l . 
ASGJUIEliT 
IDIH2LJ 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON APPEAL ANDf NEVERTHELESS, 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING 
THE STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS TO THE CRIME OF SALE 
OF A CHILD, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1978). 
Defendant, for the f i r s t time on appeal, claims that 
the jury was not adequately instructed on the elements of the 
offense of sa l e of a ch i ld as outined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-7 -
203 (1978). That s ta tute provides: 
Any person, while having custody, care, control or 
possess ion of any c h i l d , who s e l l s , or d isposes of, 
or attempts t o s e l l or dispose of, any ch i ld for 
and in considerat ion of the payment of money or 
other thing of value i s gu i l t y of a felony in the 
third degree; provided, however, t h i s sec t ion 
shal l not make i t unlawful for any person, 
agency or corporation to pay the astual and 
reasonable maternity, connected medical or 
hospita l and necessary l i v i n g expenses of the 
mother preceding and during confinement as an 
act of char i ty , so long as payment i s not made 
for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent 
or l ega l guardian to place the ch i ld for adop-
t i o n , consent t o the adoption, or cooperate in 
the completion of the adoption. 
(Emphasis added.) (S££ Addendum D.) The jury ins truct ions 
defining the elements of the offense were as fo l l ows : 
Ins truct ion No. 12: 
Before you can convict the defendant, 
J u l i e Warren Verde, of the crime of Sale 
of a Child, a Felony of the Third Degree as 
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charged in the Information, you must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all of the following elements of 
the crime: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of 
February, 1985, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the defendant, Julie Warren Verde, 
had custody, care, control or possession of 
any child; and 
2. That the defendant: 
a. sold or disposed of, or 
b. attempted to sell or dispose of 
said child; and 
3. That the defendant did so: 
a. for and in consideration of the 
payment of money, or 
b. for other thing of value; and 
4. That the defendant committed such 
act intentionally or knowingly. 
If you believe that the evidence estab-
lishes each and all of the essential elements 
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
is your duty to convict the defendant. On the 
other hand, if the evidence has failed to so 
establish one or more of said elements then 
you should find the defendant not guilty. 
Instruction No. 13: 
Under the laws of the State of Utah, a 
person commits the crime of Sale of a Child 
when the actor has custody, care, control 
or possession of any child, and the actor 
sells or disposes of, or attempts to sell 
or dispose of said child, and the actor 
does so for and in consideration of the 
payment of money or other thing of value. 
Instruction No. 14: 
You are ins tructed that a person i s 
g u i l t y of an attempt to commit a crime 
i f , act ing with the kind of c u l p a b i l i t y 
otherwise lequired for the commission of 
the of fense , he engages in conduct 
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c o n s t i t u t i n g a substant ial s tep toward 
commission of the of fense . 
(R. 49-51. ) Defendant now claims that the court should have a l so 
instructed the jury that i t i s not i l l e g a l to pay medical f l e g a l 
and other expenses necessar i ly connected with the birth and 
adoption, so long as such payment i s not inducement for the 
adoption ( c i t ing the statutory exception in S 76-7-203 and Utah 
Code Annotated § 55-8a- l (4 ) (permitting payment for l ega l f e e s 
connected with adopt ions ) ) . ($££ Addendum D and G.) She claims 
the cour t ' s f a i l u r e to so ins truc t was revers ib le error. 
F i r s t , defense counsel at t r i a l f a i l e d t o submit an 
ins truct ion concerning those except ions and did not object to 
those i n s t r u c t i o n s given a t t r i a l . When a party f a i l s t o make a 
proper and timely object ion t o an i n s t r u c t i o n , or to present a 
proper request t o the court to correct any claimed def ic iency , he 
i s thereafter precluded from contending error on those grounds. 
JStale-S^JtolADr 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985); SJ»Jt£LY*-*Mda r 
545 P.2d 190, 193 (Utah 1976) . The purpose of t h i s rule i s to 
g ive the t r i a l court an opportunity to correct or supply any 
inadequacy in the ins t ruc t ions so that the case can be decided on 
the proper b a s i s . Defendant thus waived the i s s u e s for appel late 
review. Moreover, defendant has f a i l e d to support with any l ega l 
authority her claim that the exceptions t o Sect ion 76-7-203 are 
bas ic elements requiring a jury i n s t r u c t i o n . Therefore, t h i s 
Court should not consider her challenge to the i n s t r u c t i o n s on 
t h i s ground on appeal. S£a±£-Xji-lti&£DH£ r 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 
1984) . 
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Defendant at tempts t o overcome her own procedural 
defaul t and waiver by contending tha t the t r i a l cour t 1 s f a i l u r e , 
on i t s own, to ins t ruc t the jury on the exceptions was plain 
error. Exist ing author i ty does not support defendant 's 
p o s i t i o n . 1 Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-501 (1978) provides: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding i s 
presumed to be innocent un t i l each element 
of the offense charged against him i s proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . 
(2) As used in t h i s part the words "elements 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, a t tendant circumstances, 
or r e s u l t s of conduct proscribed, prohibi ted 
or forbidden in the def in i t ion of the 
offense; 
(b) The culpable mental s t a t e required. 
(JSJB£ Addendum E.) Thus, the s ta tu tory de f in i t ion of "elements of 
the offense" does not include ac t s 3£££ptfll?l£ under the Code, but 
only those "proscribed, prohibi ted or forbidden." 
In essence, the defendant i s asking t h i s Court for a 
$£J ££ ru le providing tha t exceptions be considered e s s e n t i a l 
elements t o any crime charged which must be disproved by the 
State beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a ru le would require the 
prosecution t o put on evidence negating a l l possible acceptable 
1
 Ins t ruc t ions t o the jury in a criminal prosecution with regards 
t o exceptions and provisos are discussed generally a t 169 A.L.R. 
315, 336-37 (1947) and 75 Am. Jur . 2d I x i 3 l S 714 (1974) (s&£ 
Addendum A and B). These commentaries s t a t e there i s au thor i ty 
which holds i t i s not necessary to include exceptions or provisos 
in the jury ins t ruc t ions defining the crime charged where they 
embrace mere matters of defense, where the evidence r a i s e s no 
issue as t o the matter embraced in an exception or proviso, or 
where the i n s t ruc t ions on the aff irmative elements of the offense 
c lea r ly negate the exception or proviso. 
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a c t s under any offense or any poss ib le defense though not raised 
by the defendant. This would be unduly burdensome, prejudic ia l 
and confusing t o the jury. To require the lower courts t o 
in s t ruc t on every conceivable exception would be even more so . 
The court i s only obl igated t o ins truct on what c o n s t i t u t e s a 
crime, AtsiJLy*-Bs>b£Xt3, 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985), not what 
does not . 
A p e j jgfi rule such as the defendant proposes would be 
contrary t o Utah case law. Where the evidence a t t r i a l r a i s e s no 
i ssue as t o the matter embraced in the exception, the t r i a l court 
need not include the except ion in charging the jury as t o the 
d e f i n i t i o n of the crime. HOUSD, 704 P.2d a t 571; S£a££-X± 
tt££jxid£ll, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982); SiaJtJLJ^-PAChexifi# 27 
Utah 2d 281, 282, 495 P.2d 808, 809 (1972) . This pr inc ip l e i s 
embodied in the law of aff irmative defenses , which requires 
defendants t o timely as ser t and plead any aff irmative defenses . 
Only when t h i s i s done and the defense has introduced evidence to 
support an aff irmative defense i s the court required t o instruct 
the jury on the aff irmative defense a s ser t ed . S££i Utah Code 
Ann. SS 76-2-301 to 308 (1978 & Supp. 1986); 77-14-1 to 6 (1982 & 
Supp. 1986); 77-35-16 (c) (d) (1982); State-X*-.U2I ding, 635 P.2d 
33 , 34 (Utah 1981) . 
Further, in an ins truc t ion defining the crime charged, 
the court need not, of i t s own motion, include an except ion which 
i s merely a matter of defense . 75 Am. Jur. 2d I x i a i S 714 
(1974); ThDmaS-y^-SXate, 330 N.E.2d 325, 328 (Ind. 1975) , siting 
GlS>SS„XjL-Sta±£i 186 Ind. 581 N.E. 562, 564 (1917) . In GlQSS? the 
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court held that the complained of ins truct ion referred only to 
the d e f i n i t i o n of the o f fense , the charge pleaded, and the 
penalty the jury might a s s e s s in case of a convic t ion . "The 
exception noted in the proviso . . . i s a matter of defense in a 
proper case , and being subsequent t o the d e f i n i t i o n of a crime 
charged, i t was not necessary, as a quest ion of pleading t o 
negat ive i t . . . . This in s t ruc t ion was complete as t o the 
subject covered, and no error intervened by the f a i l u r e of the 
court, on i t s own motion, to include the proviso ." The ra t iona le 
t o t h i s rule i s that such except ions and provisos are merely 
d e f i n i t i o n a l and do not c o n s t i t u t e elements of the offense 
charged. Jd . Defendant's re l i ance for an aff irmative defense on 
Utah Code Ann. S 55 -8a- l (4 ) (supp. 1986) , which provides: 
No provis ion of [Chapter 55] precludes payment of 
f e e s for medical, l e g a l , or other lawful s e r v i c e s 
rendered in connection with the care of a mother, 
de l ivery and care of a ch i ld , or lawful adoption 
proceedings; nor may any provis ion of [Chapter 55] 
abrogate the r ight of procedures for independent 
adoption as provided by l a w [ , ] 
i s misplaced. (See Addendum G.) This s ec t i on a l lows only for 
lawful s e r v i c e s rendered on lawful adoption proceedings. Because 
the defendant was not l i c e n s e d (Tr. 266) , as required by § 55-8a-
1(2) (Supp. 1986) , her s e r v i c e s were not lawful and she cannot 
avai l herse l f of t h i s defense. 
Defendant in the ins tant case , f a i l e d t o present any 
evidence t o j u s t i f y g iving an i n s t r u c t i o n on her defenses . She 
f a i l e d t o produce evidence of real doctor, h o s p i t a l , or other 
f e e s in connection with maternity or confinement. She f a i l e d t o 
c a l l a doctor concerning actual medical s e r v i c e s or a lawyer 
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concerning actual l ega l s erv i ce s rendered in connection with a 
l e g a l adoption. The only evidence that the fee amounts mentioned 
were l ega l and medical in nature i s defendant's and v i c t i m ' s 
testimony of what the defendant to ld the v ic t im. In any event, 
she a l so to ld Watson some of the l ega l fees were to pay her for 
work she had done (Tr. 15 ) . That defendant t o l d Mrs. Watson and 
Mrs. Watson bel ieved these f e e s t o be for l ega l and medical 
expenses i s i r re l evant . To s a t i s f y the exceptions defendant 
c i t e s , there must be actual fees for lawful s erv i ce s a c t u a l l y 
rendered. Not only did defendant f a i l t o meet her duty of going 
forward with evidence proving the f e e s were actual and lawful as 
a defense, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-504 (1978), by her own 
admissions she negated those very defenses (Tr. 244, 262, 266-
67) . 
F i n a l l y , defendant's case authority in Point II of her 
brief does not support her claim that f a i l u r e t o ins truct on the 
except ions was plain or revers ib l e error. These cases involve 
a l leged errors in ins truct ing on a c t s which are prohibited, not 
those which are excepted. In each of the cases c i t e d , plain or 
revers ib le error was predicated on inadequate or inaccurate 
i n s t r u c t i o n s regarding the actual elements of the offense as 
elements are defined in § 76 -1 -501(2 ) , sixpia (Addendum E) . S££t 
S£a££-X±-.Dax9 572 P.2d 703 (Utah 1977) (no miscarriage of j u s t i c e 
where court f a i l e d to define "community standards" and a 
requirement of the offense charged was t o find defendant's 
conduct contrary to such community standards); S£a£S-.y*-L£3l£X9 
672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) ( t r i a l court erred, notwithstanding 
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a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to object t o the jury ins truc t ion , where 
i n s t r u c t i o n misstated the intent necessary to commit criminal 
t r e s p a s s ) ; SXa££~X*-Lain£* 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980) ( revers ib l e 
error found where t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s f a i l e d t o express ly 
include proper element of i n t e n t ) ; £±a.fc£_,y^_Hs>L££$ 657 P.2d 1263 
(Utah 1982) (no r e v e r s i b l e error where court refused to g ive 
separate i n s t r u c t i o n on requirement of v i c t i m 1 s re l iance in t h e f t 
by deception case because i n s t r u c t i o n was given in s tatutory 
language, which included r e l i a n c e ) ; £±3Jt£-:y*_Ite£jdy# 681 P.2d 1251 
(Utah 1984) (no r e v e r s i b l e error where spec ia l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
ins truc t ion requested by defendant was f u l l y covered by 
i n s t r u c t i o n s g iven) ; £h3mb£X£Sji„2£Q$l£, 682 P.2d 1173 (Colo. 
1984) (absent l inkage of an i n s t r u c t i o n omitting s tatutory 
culpable mental s t a t e with j o i n t operation ins truc t ion defining 
the culpable mental s t a t e , t r i a l court committed p la in error ) ; 
£&DSlS-2t*-l£>xd, 60 Cal.2d 772 f 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892 
(1964) (error in c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to g ive , on i t s own motion, an 
i n s t r u c t i o n on the e s s e n t i a l element of in tent was not 
prejudic ia l where defendant's testimony permitted of no other 
in t erpre ta t ion than that defendant enterta ined the s p e c i f i c 
intent t o s t e a l ) ; S±a±£_Y,i_Ito£, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (1983) 
(the f a i l u r e to g ive a d e f i n i t i o n a l jury i n s t r u c t i o n i s not 
e r r o r ) . In the ins tant case , the defendant claims error in 
f a i l i n g t o in s t ruc t only on a c t s l e g a l and acceptable . While the 
defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o an accurate jury ins truc t ion on a l l the 
bas ic elements of the o f f ense , Bot>£lt£§ 711 P.2d at 239, 
except ions are not among them, Utah Code Ann. § 76 -1 -501 , £]}£££• 
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The burden of showing error i s on the defendant/ who 
seeks to upset the t r i a l court1 s judgment, JB-DX£i># 704 P.2d a t 
571 , jaunting £la££„Xji„Js>DS3r 657 P.2d a t 1267* Since she has 
f a i l e d to prove through record evidence that she was e n t i t l e d to 
an i n s t r u c t i o n on the except ions , t h i s Court should assume 
regular i ty in the proceedings below and affirm the judgment. 
ICJUT-U 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
THE VICTIM'S STATE OF MIND. 
Because the defendant charges in Point I I I of her br ie f 
that defense counsel rendered a d e f i c i e n t performance in f a i l i n g 
to object t o i r re l evant , prejudic ia l and hearsay evidence, the 
State w i l l address the relevancy and a d m i s s i b i l i t y of that 
evidence in t h i s Point. The State ca l l ed s ix w i tnes se s , 
including the v ic t im, to t e s t i f y concerning the v i c t i m 1 s 
emotional condition during and immediately fol lowing the 
commission of the of fense . Defendant a s s e r t s t h i s evidence was 
inadmissible for several reasons. F i r s t , the v i c t i m 1 s mental 
condit ion was i rre levant t o prove the crime charged. Second, 
cer ta in testimony was based on out-of -court statements and 
therefore inadmissible hearsay. And t h i r d , even i f admissible , 
the probative value of the state-of-mind testimony was outweighed 
by i t s prejudic ia l and confusing e f f e c t s ; therefore , the t r i a l 
court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in allowing the testimony. 
A. The Vic t im's State of Mind Was Relevant 
To Establ i sh Defendant's Intent To 
Commit the Offense of Sale of a Child. 
Defendant contends that the t r i a l court abused i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n under Utah R. Evid. 401 , 402 and 403 by admitting (a) 
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the v i c t i m ' s and her mother's testimony concerning purchases made 
in a n t i c i p a t i o n of the adoption, (b) r e c e i p t s as proof of these 
purchases, (c) Tania Leonard's testimony that the v ic t im was 
emotionally upset after the i n c i d e n t , (d) Dr. Barton's testimony 
that the v i c t im, h i s employee, was upset , depressed and had 
attempted s u i c i d e after the inc ident , and (e) out -o f -court 
statements of severed dec larants . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , she argues 
the admission of t h i s evidence i s i r re l evant t o e s t a b l i s h that 
she "actual ly placed a ch i ld with the prosecutrix ' in 
considerat ion of the payment of money or other thing of va lue '" 
(D.B. 2 6 ) - 2 
I t must be noted a t the outse t that § 76 -7 -203 , .sijpx.&, 
does not require the State to prove that the defendant a c t u a l l y 
placed a ch i ld or received cons iderat ion. I t need only prove 
that she attempted to place a ch i ld for va lue . Under t h i s 
s t a t u t e , the commission of or attempt t o commit the offense are 
equal crimes. 
Rule 401 de f ines "relevant evidence" a s : 
evidence having any tendency to make the 
ex i s tence of any fact that i s of consequence 
t o the determination of the ac t ion more 
probable or l e s s probable than i t would be 
without the evidence. 
Rule 402 further provides t h a t , except as otherwise provided, a l l 
re levant evidence i s admiss ib le , and i r r e l e v a n t evidence i s not . 
While S 76-7-203 does not specify a culpable mental 
s t a t e in def ining the offense of sa le of a c h i l d , the s t a t e must 
2
 D.B. i s used t o c i t e to defendant's br ie f . 
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s t i l l prove mental c u l p a b i l i t y under Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-102 
(Supp. 1986) (S££ Addendum C)• The t r i e r of f ac t may infer that 
a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of h i s 
or her a c t s . State-It*-Csli&JlsS* 664 P.2d 466 (Wash. 1983); 
Stat£-X*-3l}XiS>Ilf 681 P.2d 646 (Kan. 1984) . In addi t ion , Utah law 
holds that in tent may be inferred from the ac t ions of the 
defendant or from the surrounding circumstances. States* 
HurpllY, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983) . 
In the present case , the defendant represented t o Mrs. 
Watson that she worked for an attorney (Tr. 1 3 , 14 ) , that 
together they were s e t t i n g up a pract ice for arranging adoptions 
(Tr. 1 3 ) , and that she knew of a baby due in December, 1984 which 
the Watsons could adopt (Tr. 1 4 ) . By her own admission, 
defendant fabricated a l e t t e r she represented to Mrs. Watson as 
being from "Sharon," the expectant mother (Tr. 223-24) . 
Defendant a l so to ld Mrs. Watson that Emlee was avai lable for 
adoption (Tr. 23 0) and del ivered her to Mrs. Watson on three 
occasions (Tr. 47-49, 53) , with the s tated understanding that 
Emlee was t o be the Watsons1 ch i ld (Tr. 50 , 53 , 58, 6 0 ) . 
Watson1 s subject ive b e l i e f that she was going to adopt 
a chi ld with the defendant's a id , and her subsequent depression 
and su i c ide attempt after she found out that she could not adopt 
Emlee were the natural and probable consequences of defendant's 
representat ions and conduct. Mrs. Watson's s ta te of mind, both 
during and a f ter the inc ident , i s probative of the fact that she 
had been to ld by defendant that she could adopt a ch i ld from 
defendant. This f a c t , in turn, i s probative, when taken together 
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with the fact that defendant fabricated the l e t t e r and l i e d t o 
the po l i ce about the i d e n t i t y of Emlee's mother, of the 
consequential fact that defendant intended t o and did in fact 
dispose of the ch i ld in her care for va lue . 
Defendant further attempts t o d i s t ingu i sh the v ict im 1 s 
depression and su ic ide attempt after February l f 1985, by 
claiming i t i s i rre levant as not part of the x££ Si££b2£* 
However, t h i s Court has he ld: 
The crucial quest ion in a l l cases i s 
whether the statement was made while the 
declarant was s t i l l under the influence 
of the event to the extent that h i s 
statement could not be the r e s u l t of 
f a b r i c a t i o n , intervening a c t i o n s , or the 
exerc i se of choice of judgment. 
StaJt^Jfc-JteimiflDf 588 P.2d 162, 163 (Utah 1978) , s i t i n g JltonstaD 
X*-Qbis>, 76 Wash. 2d 398, 457 P.2d 194, 199 (1969); 22A C.J.S. 
£jijniiialwl»Ay S 671 (1961) (ac t s , conduct, dec lara t ions , 
statements made by the injured person a f ter an offense are 
admissible as part of the X££ 5£-SJtfl£ when they were made at such 
time and place and under such circumstances as t o exclude the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of des ign, premeditation of f a b r i c a t i o n , and as to 
ind ica te they were spontaneous express ions of a s t a t e of mind 
£I£at£&-bl?^£b£-a££-£b3XSl£d) • While Fed. R. Evid. 803(1) , which 
was adopted verbatim in Utah R. Evid. 8 0 3 ( 1 ) , abandons the X£3 
S£££&£ concept as unduly confusing and vague, ite.axjs.aY, 4 
Weinste in 's Evid. (MB) 1 803(1)101] (1985), i t adopts s imi lar 
c r i t e r i a under a cont inui ty of event a n a l y s i s . I t i s for the 
t r i a l court to decide, in i t s d i s c r e t i o n , whether a given 
statement or conduct f a l l s within or without the j er iod of 
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continuous mental process from the event. The standard of review 
i s abuse of discretion. Uidt£sLStat£3-.2r*-2£>Ltis:£lllr 622 F.2d 
985, 991 (9th C i r . ) , ££it. Asnied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); State-** 
B&smiXSLSen, 92 Utah 357, 68 P.2d 176, 178-79 (1937); States* 
Jftc£L&i-Dr 706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985). 
Under t h i s ana lys i s , the jury could reasonably have 
found t h a t the v i c t im ' s depression and attempted suicide were 
•spontaneous expressions of her s t a t e of mind created by the ac t 
defendant was charged with. The pos s ib i l i t y tha t Watson feigned 
her depression and put her own l i f e in pe r i l to improve her 
pos i t ion in a subsequent lawsuit i s too remote to be considered. 
B. The Vict im's Out-Of-Court Statements 
Made During the Commission of the 
Offense Were Not Inadmissible Hearsay; 
Moreover, Any Admission of Hearsay 
Statements Was Harmless Error. 
Defendant's claim tha t the v i c t i m ' s out-of-court 
statements were inadmissible as hearsay should be re jected for 
two reasons. F i r s t , her f a i l u r e to object to the i r admission on 
t h i s ground a t t r i a l precludes her ra i s ing i t on appeal. Utah R. 
Evid. 103(a)(1) ; IteZaifell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982). 
Second, assuming the issue could be reached, Judge Wilkinson 
properly found tha t Watson's out-of-court statements t o witnesses 
Colvin and Leonard were admissible under Utah R. Evid. 801, 
803(1), or 803(3). Rule 801 provides: 
The following def in i t ions apply under t h i s 
a r t i c l e : 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" i s a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while 
t e s t i fy ing a t the t r i a l or hearing, offered 
in e^  idence to prove the t ru th of the matter 
asse r ted . 
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(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement i s not hearsay i f 
(1) Prior statements by wi tness . The 
declarant t e s t i f i e s a t the t r i a l or 
hearing and i s subject t o cross-examination 
concerning the statement and the statement 
i s (A) incons i s tent with h i s testimony or 
the witness denies having made the statement 
or has forgot ten , or (B) £Qi\si&££i&-}ti±±b-hi5 
JDX. implied chaise- a&ad xtat. hisL j?JLi£r£JXt 
or (C) one of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a person 
made af ter perceiving him; . . • 
(Emphasis added.) This Court has been l i b e r a l in i t s 
in terpre ta t ion of the appl icable rule in the area of 
contemporaneous statements. S£a££-Xjt-Sib£l£ i 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 
P.2d 388 (1957) . 
Tania Leonard's testimony that the v ict im said she was 
adopting a ch i ld through the defendant, that defendant had given 
her a l e t t e r from the expectant mother, and that defendant had 
given Emlee to her to adopt i s non-hearsay s ince these statements 
were not offered t o prove the truth of the ir content, but t o show 
the v ic t im be l ieved she was going t o adopt a ch i ld through the 
defendant. Utah R. Evid. 8 0 1 ( c ) . 
This testimony, as wel l as Ronda Colvin 1 s testimony 
that the v ic t im explained t o her she was paying for the shots in 
exchange for a reduction in l e g a l f e e s , was a l so admissible as 
non-hearsay under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) as evidence of Mrs. 
Watson's prior cons i s t ent statements . The rule provides that a 
statement i s not hearsay i f the declarant t e s t i f i e s a t t r i a l , i s 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement i s cons i s t en t with her testimony and offered t o rebut 
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an express or implied charge against her of recent fabr icat ion or 
improper inf luence or motive. 
There has been suggest ion in several recent federal 
cases that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) a l s o appl ies "Iwlhere the judge 
construes a l i n e of quest ioning t o be directed towards impugning 
the memory of the w i tnes s ." In these ins tances , "he w i l l allow a 
cons i s tent statement made when the event was recent and memory 
fresh to be received in support." l}Edt££LS£a±£3-XjL-K£ll£Jr 145 
F. Supp. 692, 697 (D.N.J. 1956) . 3££ 3l£Q, i)Liir£&Ste±££-X+ 
JCfilJsmaiBF 631 F.2d 908, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1980); ]]xd±££u2/*-B£Ixing, 
582 F.2d 535 541 (10th Cir. 1978); ]Jjd±£A-S±a±£3-}l*-lta3S>LS, 584 
F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1978) . 
Watson was the f i r s t wi tness ca l l ed a t t r i a l and was 
heavi ly cross-examined. The defense implied that Mrs. Watson, 
through her previous attempts t o adopt, should have known that 
defendant could not provide a ch i ld as she had represented (Tr. 
76) • The defense a l so implied that Watson had recent ly 
fabricated her explanation of the incident by suggesting she had 
other motives for the purchase of c h i l d r e n ' s c lo th ing , that her 
purchases were gratui tous and not perpetuated by the promised 
adoption (Tr. 74 , 80 , 83 , 8 8 ) , and that defendant had to ld her 
Emlee was not adoptable (Tr. 86) . Mrs. Watson was further 
impeached during cross-examination by the impl icat ion that 
defendant had not to ld Mrs. Watson she was working for an agency 
(Tr. 76) , that during the preliminary hearing she had sa id 
nothing about a steady increase in fees (Tr. 82) , that her 
testimony that defendant contacted her at home beginning in 
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September was f a l s e (Tr. 83) , and that she did not pay for the 
shots (Tr. 85, 98) , par t i cu lar ly in exchange for reduced l e g a l 
f e e s (Tr. 103 -04 ) . Watson's prior statements t o Colvin and 
Leonard, which were cons i s t en t with her testimony a t t r i a l , were 
admiss ible to r e h a b i l i t a t e and corroborate her testimony in t h i s 
regard. S£a££-Xj*S£££Xi No. 20418, s l i p op. a t 3-4 (Utah Sup. 
C t . , May 1 , 1986); States*-JtM^l£iS>J^, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 
1215, 1217 (1983). 
Even i f Watson1s out -of -court statements t o Colvin and 
Leonard were somehow viewed as hearsay, they would s t i l l be 
admissible under at l e a s t two except ions t o the hearsay rule , 
Utah R. Evid. 803(1) and ( 3 ) . Rule 803(1) e s t a b l i s h e s the 
fo l lowing except ion: 
A statement describing or explaining an 
event or condit ion made while the declarant 
was perceiving the event or condit ion or 
immediately thereaf ter . 
Rule 803(3) except s : 
[a] statement of dec larant ' s then 
e x i s t i n g s ta te of mind, emotion, sensat ion , 
or physical condit ion (such as i n t e n t , plan, 
motive, des ign, mental f e e l i n g , pain, and 
bodily health) • • . 
Because Rule 803(3) i s e s s e n t i a l l y a s p e c i a l i z e d 
appl i ca t ion of Rule 803(1) Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee 
no te s , much of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for one app l i e s to the other. 
As pointed out in Point I I . A . , the crucia l quest ion i s whether 
the statement was made while the declarant was s t i l l under the 
inf luence of the event t o the extent h i s statement could not be 
the r e s u l t of f a b r i c a t i o n , intervening a c t i o n s , or the e x e r c i s e 
of choice or judgment. UcHillADr 588 P.2d a t 163 . The t r i a l 
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court dec ides , in i t s d i s c r e t i o n , whether a statement or conduct 
f a l l s wi thin the continuous mental process from the event. The 
standard of review i s abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . JPjoatijEfilli, 622 F.2d 
at 991; B&SIWSSSn, 92 Utah 357, 68 P.2d a t 178-79; HcSlaiD, 706 
P.2d a t 604. 
Mrs. Watson1s out -of -court statements were made 
contemporaneous to and while she was under the influence of the 
purported adoption arrangement. Moreover, they describe the 
conduct of the defendant. Therefore, Mrs. Watson's statements 
were admissible under Rule 8 0 3 ( 1 ) . Moreover, Watson's statements 
a t that time are the best evidence of her in tent and plan to 
obtain a ch i ld through the defendant; thus admissible hearsay 
under Rule 801(3) . 
Because defendant did not object t o Leonard's testimony 
that Socia l Services to ld her defendant did not work for them and 
that the ch i ldren ' s center said they did not have a chi ld named 
Emlee, or Detect ive Smith's testimony that the Utah State 
Hospital to ld him there was no pat ient there under name the 
defendant had given as Emlee's mother, defendant cannot now 
challenge the i r admission on appeal. Utah R. Evid. 1 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; 
IteCaistel1, J5.up.jj&. Also, defendant may not claim error because no 
substant ia l r ight of defendant was a f fec ted by the admission of 
t h i s testimony as required by Rule 103(a ) , supiA. The admission 
of t h i s testimony concerning defendant's representat ions was 
merely cumulative* 
Defendant herse l f t e s t i f i e d that the ch i ld was with her 
mother and therefore not in a ch i ldren ' s center or fo s t er home 
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during the times Mrs* Watson did not have her (Tr. 229-30) • She 
admitted she did not work for any adoption agency or lawyer 
concerning arranging adoptions (Tr* 266) . June Burkhardt 
t e s t i f i e d that she was not h o s p i t a l i z e d for her i l l n e B s in 
January, 1985. The v i c t im, Mrs. Watson, a l so t e s t i f i e d that she 
had become susp ic ious , checked on the defendant's 
representat ions , and found them to be f a l s e (Tr. 5 6 - 5 7 ) . Thus, 
very l i t t l e hearsay evidence regarding the d e f e n d a n t s 
fabr i ca t ions was brought out by Leonard and Smith alone. Because 
ex lus ion of Leonard's and Smith's hearsay statements would not 
present a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f erent r e s u l t , any error 
in the admission of such testimony i s harmless. S££ JXL-Re_EjS±fl±.e 
J?f-ItacJs9 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982) (improper admission of hearsay 
evidence was harmless error because exc lus ion thereof would not 
present l i k e l i h o o d of d i f f erent r e s u l t ) ; S±£±£-XjL-G3Xshini£# 652 
P.2d 1342 (Utah 1982) (admission of hearsay evidence connecting 
defendant with crime not prejudic ia l where prior testimony also 
connected defendant to same conduct connecting defendant to the 
crime)• 
C. The Probative Force of the V ic t im' s 
State of Mind Far Outweighs Any 
Prejudice or Confusion I t May Have 
Caused; A l t ernat ive ly , Defendant's 
Fai lure to Object Under Utah R. Evid. 
403 Bars Review of the Claim on Appeal. 
Defendant a s s e r t s tha t , assuming the s t a t e of mind 
testimony was otherwise proper, i t should have been excluded by 
the t r i a l court because i t s "probative value i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
i s s u e s , or misleading the jury . • . •" Utah R. Evid. 403. She 
- 2 6 -
s p e c i f i c a l l y objec t s t o Watson's and Jackson's testimony 
concerning purchases and Dr. Barton's testimony about Watson's 
su ic ide attempt. The advisory committee notes t o Fed. R. Evid. 
403, which Utah has adopted almost verbatim, c a l l for balancing 
the probative value of the need for the part icular evidence 
against the harm l i k e l y t o r e s u l t from i t s admission. 
The appel la te c o u r t ' s power of review i s 
r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d . The t e s t i t i s forced 
to apply, since i t was not present a t 
t r i a l , w i l l normally require i t t o assume 
the maximum probative force a reasonable 
jury might a s s e s s and the minimum prejudice 
to be reasonably expected. 
B£l3xan£X-ansLJt£-Limi££, 1 Weinste in's Evid. (MB) % 401101] 
(1985) . Xexas-Eastsin-IiansnissiDi^x^-lteiiL-QfSi££±-E±c+1 57 9 
P.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1978); E„Jk-S-D££3bs>I£*-In£*-X+-K+Q*-SX££l 
CaStiasSx-JnC*, 662 F.2d 1104, 1101-08 (5th Cir. 1981) . 
Respondent has already shown in Points I.A. and B. f 
£USX3i that the evidence was highly relevant and probative. The 
s t a t e must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense 
occurred. Without evidence of the v i c t i m ' s s t a t e of mindf there 
would be l i t t l e if no evidence of defendant's culpable mental 
s t a t e or conduct. Furthermore, a defendant i s not l e f t h e l p l e s s . 
She may vigorously cross-examine the S t a t e ' s w i tnesses , c a l l her 
own to vouch for her good character, impeach the c r e d i b i l i t y of 
the complainant and the S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s , and d i s c l o s e any 
weaknesses in expert opinion testimony. Defendant was given f u l l 
opportunity to present evidence of t h i s nature in t h i s case . 
Thus, defendant has f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h that the probativeness of 
the testimony was "substant ia l ly outweighed" by prejudice to her. 
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Moreover, defendant did not ra ise any object ion t o the 
testimony under Rule 403, except that of Dr. Barton. She i s 
therefore precluded from chal lenging on t h i s ground for the f i r s t 
time on appeal. Utah R. Evid. 1 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) ; Sta JtfL.y,i_ Hi £ sbsll # 671 
P.2d 213, 214 (Utah 1983) . As t o Barton1 s testimony, the 
objec t ion was based s o l e l y on the ground there was no 
"material i ty* a f t er February 1 , 1985, when defendant was arrested 
(Tr. 256) . Under S±ai£_^_I>j3tfi-S, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984) , the 
defendant must have s p e c i f i c a l l y s tated t o the t r i a l court the 
same grounds for object ion t o evidence she presents on appeal. 
Because the defendant did not s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e prejudice and 
confusion as grounds for objec t ion t o the t r i a l court , t h i s Court 
should not address i t . 
This Court "wil l not i n t e r f e r e with the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
ru l ing on evident iary matters unless i t c l e a r l y appears that the 
court so abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n that there i s a l ike l ihood that 
i n j u s t i c e re su l t ed ." BzZlAin, 7 06 P.2d at 604, siting StatS-St* 
IteCaiaell, -supx^, and Stete-X^Dantel, 599 P.2d 518 (Utah 1979) . 
JBIMLJJJ 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF SALE OF 
OF A CHILD, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76 -7 -203 . 
Defendant a s s e r t s the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o 
support the j u r y f s verdic t of g u i l t . The pert inent elements of 
the offense under the f a c t s of t h i s case are s e t forth in Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-7-203 (1978) as f o l l o w s : 
Any person, whi le having custody, caro, 
control or possess ion of any c h i l d , wlio 
s e l l s , or d i sposes of, or attempts t o 
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s e l l or dispose of, any ch i ld for and 
in consideration of the payment of 
money or other thing of value i s g u i l t y 
of a felony of the third degree; • . • 
Note that the above sec t ion punishes an attempt t o s e l l a ch i ld 
equally with the completed act* Utah's attempt s t a t u t e , Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-4-101 (1982) , provides: 
(1) For purposes of t h i s part a person 
i s gu i l ty of an attempt t o commit a 
crime i f , act ing with the kind of 
c u l p a b i l i t y otherwise required for the 
commission of the of fense , he engages 
in conduct cons t i tu t ing a substant ial 
s t ep toward commission of the of fense . 
(2) For purposes of t h i s part, conduct 
does not c o n s t i t u t e a substant ia l s tep 
unless i t i s strongly corroborative of 
the a c t o r ' s in tent to commit the o f fense . 
Although the "substantial step" standard of S 76-4-101 i s "for 
purposes of t h i s part" of the code, there i s no l o g i c a l reason 
the "substantial step" t e s t should not be applied t o s p e c i f i c 
attempt of fenses found elsewhere in the code. The a n a l y s i s ought 
to be the same. 
This Court has s tated that § 76-4-101 adopts the 
d e f i n i t i o n of an "attempt" employed in the Model Penal Code, § 
5 . 0 1 , "purposed on drawing the l i n e further away from the f ina l 
ac t and enlarging the common law concept" which required in tent 
and an act lending but f a i l i n g t o accomplish the crime. S£SL££-)LJL 
J?jeaX-SDD, 680 P.2d 405, 408 (Utah 1984) . The s ta tu te emphasizes 
what the accused has done, not what i s l e f t to be completed. I d . 
"Substantial step" means any conduct, whether act, omission or 
possess ion , which strongly corroborates the firmness of the 
a c t o r ' s purpose to complete the commission of the rrime. JPfifij?l£ 
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.^JE'JCyjSi.g r 628 P.2d 1004 (Colo. 1981) . This standard properly 
d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n to overt a c t s of the accused which demonstrate 
convincingly a firm purpose to commit a crime, while allowing 
p o l i c e in tervent ion , based upon information or observation of 
such incriminating conduct, in order to prevent the crime when 
the criminal intent becomes apparent. £±3±£_ .^*_Wl>xJuwaDr 90 Wash. 
2d 443 , 584 P.2d 382 (1978) , ijUDiing S±a±£-X*-US)QdS* 48 Ohio 
St .2d 127, 132 357 N.E. 2d 1059, 1063 (1979). The quest ion of 
whether a s tep i s "substantial" under the part icular f a c t s of the 
case i s c l e a r l y for the f a c t - f i n d e r . IteZazdsll, sjjipxa; Itlstikmaiif 
584 P.2d a t 386. In the present case , the jury was ins tructed on 
both the commission and attempt t h e o r i e s , Jury Ins truct ion Nos. 
12 , 13 and 14, .aupx.3 (R. 4 9 - 5 1 ) , indicat ing the court be l ieved 
the standard appropriate for t h i s s p e c i f i c attempt o f fense . 
Applying the above statutory elements t o the f a c t s of 
t h i s case , the evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t to support defendant's 
conv ic t ion . The record evidence e s t a b l i s h e s that defendant had 
care, control and possess ion of Emlee Burkhardt, a c h i l d , on 
several occas ions , and that on those occasions she var ious ly 
represented to Mrs. Watson that she could have the ch i ld for a 
t r i a l period, that the ch i ld was a v a i l a b l e for adoption, and that 
the baby was now hers (Tr. 48 , 53 , 58 , 60 , 230-31) . The so l e 
contention by defendant on appeal i s that the S ta te f a i l e d t o 
e s t a b l i s h that she attempted to s e l l or dispose of a ch i ld in 
cons iderat ion of the payment of money or other thing of value. 
Yet, she concedes that after she discussed the subject of 
arrarging an adoption with Mrs. Watson, she did not pay for her 
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own medical b i l l s for d i e t shots (Tr. 240 ) . She a l so concedes 
that , on one occasion when she de l ivered Emlee to Mrs. Watson, 
she asked Mrs. Watson for gas money, and Mrs. Watson gave her 
$5.00 (Tr. 53-54) . However, she contends that the State did not 
prove these exchanges were in considerat ion for the purchase of a 
c h i l d . In other words, she claims these expenses were not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y "linked" t o the purchase of the c h i l d . 
Consideration for money or other thing of value i s a 
quest ion of fact for the jury. Whether i t was appropriate for 
the jury to reasonably infer that these exchanges of money or 
things of value were, in f a c t , in considerat ion of the sa le of a 
ch i ld are determined from a l l of the f a c t s and circumstances of 
t h i s case . 
The defendant made several representat ions and 
committed several a c t s which were substant ia l s teps towards the 
commission of the crime of sa l e of a c h i l d . Defendant approached 
Mrs. Watson about the p o s s i b i l i t y of adopting a chi ld (Tr. 13, 
€ 8 ) . She suggested dol lar amounts for l ega l and medical f ees 
(Tr. 14-15 , 40-41) , yet never produced any evidence or testimony 
from a lawyer, doctor or mother concerning actual l ega l or 
medical expenses l e g i t i m i z i n g these f e e s . Defendant further said 
that h£I JKPlJk and the lawyer's work would cost $500.00 (Tr. 1 4 , 
7 1 ) . 
Defendant received $80.00 to $90.00 worth of d i e t 
shots , which the v ic t im, Mrs. Watson, paid for (Tr. 166) , in 
exchange for a reduction in the supposed l e g a l f e e s (Tr# 1 5 , 4 3 -
44 , 103-04) . This shows the defendant was attempting to rece ive 
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and was personal ly receiving c o n s i d e r a t i o n even though the 
v ict im thought the payments were to reduce l e g a l f e e s . The 
defendant's vers ion that the shots were "on the house" i s 
i n c r e d i b l e . I t hardly seems l i k e l y that Mrs. Watson would pay 
for a p a t i e n t ' s shots without expecting something in return. Nor 
does i t seem l i k e l y Dr. Barton would s ing le out the defendant for 
gratui tous treatment ("on the house") over a l l h i s other pa t i en t s 
(Tr. 170) . 
Defendant brought Emlee t o the Watson home for a t r i a l 
period (Tr. 4 8 ) , to ld her Emlee was ava i lab le for adoption (Tr. 
47 -49 , 230) , and asked Mrs. Watson i f she wanted t o adopt Emlee 
(Tr. 50) . She a l s o to ld Mrs. Watson to t reat Emlee as her own 
(Tr. 4 1 ) . The defendant subsequently took Emlee back and 
redel ivered her twice . Prior to the or ig ina l de l ivery date of 
January 14 th , the defendant asked Mrs. Watson t o have $500.00 
advance payment ready to cover paperwork (Tr. 105) . She a l so 
received $5.00 d i rec t cons iderat ion on January 7th for having t o 
de l iver the chi ld (Tr. 53-54) . This was c l e a r l y not for l ega l or 
medical f e e s . When defendant made the l a s t de l ivery on February 
1 s t , she to ld the v ic t im the c h i l d was hers (Tr. 60 -61 f 128) . 
She further indicated she would "be in touch" with Mrs. Watson 
(Tr. 6 1 ) . 
Defendant contends that i t was unreasonable for the 
jury to be l i eve $85.00 to $95.00 would buy a c h i l d . But t h i s 
Court should note that Mrs. Watson was s t i l l paying for the 
defendant's d i e t shots up to the defendant's arres t (Tr. 61 -62) . 
This arrangement was continuous from October to January. I t i s 
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p o s s i b l e these shot payments were to continue i n d e f i n i t e l y . 
These amounts a lso could have been merely the down payment. 
Defendant had mentioned f e e s of between $2,500.00 to $5 ,000 .00 . 
Because she further s tated on February 1s t that she would be in 
touch with Mrs. Watson, i t i s reasonable to infer that she 
intended to c o l l e c t the balance of these f e e s at some future 
date. While Mrs. Watson may have bel ieved these were to be for 
medical and l ega l f e e s as discussed above, defendant offered no 
evidence to prove they actua l ly e x i s t e d . The jury could a l s o 
reasonably have inferred that these exchanges and fees discussed 
were and would be received by the defendant in considerat ion for 
the sa le of the c h i l d . 
Defendant a l s o contends that i t was unreasonable for 
the jury to be l i eve defendant would s e l l her best f r i e n d ' s ch i ld 
when the c h i l d ' s mother knew the defendant had taken her on 
February 1 s t . However, the offense occurred on January 4 , 1985, 
when the defendant f i r s t del ivered Emlee to Mrs. Watson with the 
representat ion Mrs. Watson could adopt Emlee. The State c a l l e d 
Mrs. Burkhardt, who t e s t i f i e d that a t that time she did not 
r e a l l y know where Emlee was (Tr. 189-90, 197) . She t e s t i f i e d she 
was very i l l (Tr. 194-95 , 198) and trusted the defendant t o care 
for her children because she had nowhere e l s e to go (Tr. 197) . 
I t i s pos s ib l e Mrs. Burkhardt, f inding herse l f very s ick , asked 
the defendant to help her f ind someone t o take her chi ldren. Her 
testimony i s f u l l of uncer ta in t i e s about dates , p laces and 
people. I t i s therefore a l so poss ib le defendant was taking 
advantage of Mrs. Burkhardt's d i s o r i e n t a t i o n and s i ckness t o s e l l 
Emlee and pass the blame to someone e l s e . 
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The defendant int imates that Mrs. Watson's suspic ions 
should have been arouseed when she got a 13-month-oldi ch i ld 
instead of a newborn. However, there i s evidence in the record 
to show that the Watson family be l ieved they were ge t t ing both 
chi ldren t o adopt. Defendant to ld Mrs. Watson's mother that Mrs. 
Watson was s t i l l going to get the newborn baby (Tr. 137) . She 
further to ld Mrs. Watson she should get two car s e a t s , one for 
Emlee and one for the baby (Tr. 138) . 
All of the above f a c t s ind ica te substant ia l s teps 
strongly corroborating defendant's in tent to s e l l a ch i ld for 
money .and other things of value . Point I I , Sii$i3, demonstrates 
there was substant ia l evidence the defendant had the r e q u i s i t e 
in tent t o commit the offense of s a l e of a c h i l d . Therefore, 
there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to prove actual commission and 
attempt, equivalent crimes under the s t a t u t e . 
As pointed out in State-X*~BDQk£Xi 709 P.2d 342, 345 
(Utah 1985) , where a defendant claims the evidence was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t to s u s t a i n his conv ic t ion , the standard of review i s 
narrow. 
"[Wle review the evidence and a l l inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from i t in the 
l i g h t most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury convict ion £>ixly when 
the evidence, so viewed, i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
inconclus ive or inherent ly improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." Stats 
X±„2£tl££, Utah, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (1983); 
A£MliJ# StatS-X^-ttcZaidsll, Utah, 652 P.2d 
942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the conv ic t ion , 
we do not s u b s t i t u t e our judgment for that of 
the jury. "It i s the e x c l u s i v e funct ion of 
the jury tc weigh the evidence and t o determine 
the c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i tnes se s . • . ." 
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£±a±£-X*-LaSWt Utah 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
A££0ld# JSiflije.^-Lilxdej), Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 
1366 (1983) . So long as there i s some evidence, 
including reasonable in ferences , from which 
f indings of a l l the r e q u i s i t e elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry s tops . 
(Emphasis added.) 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN OF 
SHOWING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
DENIED HER A FAIR TRIAL. 
This Court recent ly held tha t , in order to challenge a 
convict ion on the bas i s of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of counsel , " i t 
i s the defendant's burden t o show: (1) that her counsel rendered 
a d e f i c i e n t performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) 
that , but for counse l ' s error, the outcome of the t r i a l would 
probably have been d i f f e r e n t . Codiaixixa^Xji-lUQXXiSr Utah, 660 P.2d 
1101 (1983) . 3££ 3lj&, JJx&±3aLS±ate&.X*-£rSJ0±£, 466 U.S. 648, 
104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); S±Jl£klai)&-X*-}lasbins£S>]y, 
466 U.S. 668 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)." £±a±£_Y.a 
QS3JX, 707 P.2d 645 646 (Utah 1985) • 
Defendant claims three general errors t o demonstrate 
defense counse l ' s d e f i c i e n t performance: the f a i l u r e to object 
t o jury ins truc t ions omitting the exceptions and t o request an 
i n s t r u c t i o n including them as elements; second, the admission 
without object of irre levant and prejudic ia l evidence; and 
f i n a l l y , the admission without object ion of hearsay statements. 
There i s no evidence in the record t o show defense 
counsel rendered a demonstrably d e f i c i e n t performance. As 
demonstrated in Point I , jsjuj?X5r defendant was not e r t i t l e d t o a 
jury ins truc t ion on the exceptions because the law did not 
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require i t and the evidence in t h i s case did not j u s t i f y i t . 
Therefore, defense counsel acted properly in not requesting 
i n s t r u c t i o n s or object ing t o the i n s t r u c t i o n s in t h i s regard. 
Further f Point I I . A. , .sjjipxa, shows that the complained 
of testimony was evidence of the v i c t i m ' s s t a t e of mind, and that 
her s t a t e of mind was relevant t o e s t a b l i s h the r e q u i s i t e conduct 
and c u l p a b i l i t y required under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (Supp. 
1986) (Addendum C). The probative force of t h i s testimony 
outweighed any p o s s i b i l i t y of prejudice or confusion. Point I I . 
B . , fjupxa. 
The S ta te demonstrates in Point I I . C . that the 
testimony defendant claims i s inadmiss ible hearsay i s , in f a c t , 
e i ther nonhearsay or within an except ion t o the hearsay rule . 
Therefore, because t h i s evidence was re levant , nonhearsay or 
excepted hearsay, any objec t ions by defense counsel would have 
been f u t i l e . Fai lure t o make motions or objec t ions f u t i l e i f 
ra i sed i s not i n e f f e c t i v e ass i s tance of counsel . ££jdij8DD3_Y.* 
HsxrijB, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) . 
Since there was no d e f i c i e n t performance or error by 
defense counsel , i t i s improbable that the j u r y ' s v e r d i c t would 
have been d i f f e r e n t . Consequently, the defendant f a i l s t o meet 
the two-pronged t e s t of fiejaxy, SHPIA9 to e s t a b l i s h i n e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e of counsel . 
£QB£LD32QB 
Because defendant was not e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n on 
the except ions to the offense charged, defendant waived h i s right 
to chal lenge the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence proven t o be relevant 
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and admiss ible , and there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to support the 
j u r y ' s f inding of consideration for money or other thing of value 
in exchange for a c h i l d , the State urges t h i s Court to affirm 
defendant's convict ion for v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-203 
(19788), sa l e of a c h i l d . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s J L ^ l day of July , 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing brief of respondent to Robert Van Sciver 
and Margo L. James, attorneys for appel lant , 321 South 600 East, 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84102, postage prepaid, t h i s day of 
Jj&TT 1986 
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ADDENDUM A 
A n n o t . , 169 A.L.R. 315 , 336-37 (1947) 
Z. Exceptions and proviso* 
Questions sometimes arise, in con-
nection with the employment of statu-
tory language in defining or explaining 
the offense charged to the jury, of the 
necessity of referring to exceptions or 
provisos contained in the statute. In 
this connection there is authority to 
support the conclusions that where an 
exception or proviso embraces mere 
matters of defense, where the evidence 
in the case raises no issue as to the 
matter embraced in an exception or 
proviso, or where the instruction on 
the affirmative elements of the offense 
clearly involves the negation of the ex-
ception or proviso, it is not necessary 
to include the exception or proviso in 
charging the jury, by the use of the 
statutory language, as to the definition 
of the crime. 
In Gross v. State (1917) 186 Ind 581, 
117 NE 562, 1 ALR 1151, a prosecution 
for drawing a dangerous weapon on 
another person, the court, m overrul-
ing the contention that an instruction 
given by the trial judge was erroneous 
for failing to include a proviso which 
was part of the statutory section de-
fining the offense charged, said: "This 
Instruction refers only to the definition 
of the offense, the charge pleaded, and 
the penalty the jury might assess in 
case of a conviction. The first count 
•pon which appellant was convicted is 
based upon § 2344, Burns 1914, Acts 
1905, pp 584, 687. The exception noted 
in the proviso of that section is a mat-
ter of defense in a proper case, and 
being subsequent to the definition of 
the crime charged, it*was not neces-
sary, as a question of pleading, to neg-
ative it. . . . This instruction was 
complete as to the subject covered, and 
no error intervened by the failure of 
the court, on its own motion, to include 
the proviso." 
In Holmes v. State (1906) 82 Neb 
406, 118 NW 99, a prosecution under a 
statute providing that if any clerk, 
agent, attorney at law, etc., "of any 
private person or any copartnership, 
except apprentices and persons within 
the age of eighteen years," should con-
vert money of such person to his own 
use, he was guilty of an offense, it was 
contended by defendant that the trial 
judge, in defining the offense, failed 
properly to charge the exception in 
the court held that since the instruc-
tions clearly indicated that defendant 
was an attorney, and since applicable 
statutes prohibited any person under 
twenty-one years of age from being an 
attorney, the language in the charge 
which covered the affirmative part of 
the statute necessarily involved the 
negation of the exception, and the in-
stroction was consequently no ground 
for reversal of the conviction. 
Where defendant was prosecuted for 
rape under a statute setting forth the 
offense of carnal knowledge of a fe-
male child under the age of sixteen 
years and containing a proviso that if 
the jury should find that the alleged 
victim was not of good repute and the 
intercourse was with her consent, de-
fendant should be acquitted of rape 
and convicted of fornication only, it 
was held in Com. v. Stewart (1933» 110 
Pa Super Ct 279, 168 A 528, that since 
there was no proper testimony that the 
victim in the present case was of bad 
repute, there was no occasion for the 
court to read the proviso to the jury, 
and error could not be based upon the 
circumstance that in charging the jury 
the trial judge read only the affirma-
tive portion of the enactment and did 
not read the proviso. "Had defendant 
attempted to establish, in a proper 
manner," the court added, "the bad 
repute of the girl as part of his de-
fense, then it would have become the 
duty of the court to read the proviso." 
ADDENDUM B 
75 Am. J u r . 2d T r i a l S 714 ( 1 9 7 4 ) 
§ 714 TRIAL 75 Am Jur 2d 
§ 714. Instructing in language of statute. 
In charging as to the elements of the crime, the court may use the language 
of the statute violated,-0 and may indeed, quote the statute itself,*1 except for 
inapplicable parts.-1 So too, where the crime charged is defined in one 
subdivision of a statute, it is error to read to the jury the other subdivisions 
defining unrelated crimes.-3 But the failure to eliminate the inapplicable 
portions of the definition is not ground for reversal where no prejudice results 
therefrom,-4 or where, reading the charge as a whole, the instruction upon the 
subject of the offense is limited to the allegations of the indictment or 
information.* While, as has been indicated, it is proper ot employ the precise 
language of a controlling statute in defining the offense charged, it is not 
necessary to do so, and a failure to do il will not be regarded as erroneous if 
all the elements of the ofTense are correctly set forth in the language of the 
judge* 
In an instruction defining the crime charged, the court need not of its own 
motion include a statutory exception which is merely a matter of defense.-7 
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ADDENDUM C 
Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 2 - 1 0 2 (Supp . 1986) 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liabil-
ity. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable men-
tal state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable 
mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowl-
edge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An 
offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for 
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof 
of any culpable mental state. 
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ADDENDUM D 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-7-203 (1978) 
76-7-203. Bale of child—Any person, while having custody, care, con-
trol, or possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, or attempts to 
•ell or dispose of, any child for and in consideration of the payment of 
money or other thing of value is guilty of a felony of the third degree; 
provided, however, this section shall not make it unlawful for any person, 
agency, or corporation to pay the actual and reasonable maternity, con-
nected medical or hospital and necessary living expenses of the mother 
preceding and during confinement as an act of charity, so long as payment 
is not made for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or legal guard-
ian to place the child for adoption, consent to the adoption, or co-operate 
in the completion of the adoption. 
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ADDENDUM E 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-501, 502 and 504 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence—''Element of the offense" de-
fined.—(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be in-
nocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be 
acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct pro-
scribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the 
offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation or proof—When not re-
quired.—Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of evidence pre-
sented at trial, either by the prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has pre-
sented evidence of such affirmative defense. 
76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by defendant.—Evidence of an 
affirmative defense as defined by this code or other statutes shall be pre-
sented by the defendant 
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ADDENDUM F 
Utah Code Ann. 8 76-4-101 (1978) 
76-4401. Attempt—Elements of offense.—(1) For purposes of this 
part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission 
of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial 
step unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit 
the offense. 
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ADDENDUM G 
Utah Code Ann. S 55-8a-l (1974) 
55-8a~l. "Child placing" defined—License requirement—Limitations on 
unlicensed individuals—Commencement of action for violation.—(1) For 
purposes of this act, child placing is the receiving, acceptance or providing 
custody or care for any child under eighteen years, temporarily or per-
manently, for the purpose of finding a person to adopt such child or placing 
the child temporarily or permanently in a home for adoption or foster 
home placement 
F (2) No person, agency, firm, corporation or association, or group~chiT 
dren homes shall engage in child placing, or solicit money or other assist-
ance for child placing, without having a valid written license from the 
[division of family services. 1 
(3) An attorney, physician or other person may assist a parent in iden-
tifying or locating a person interested in the adoption of a child of the 
parent, or assist a person in identifying or locating a child to be adopted; 
provided that no payment, charge, fee, reimbursement of expense, or ex-
change of value of any kind, or promise or agreement to make the same, 
may be made for any assistance. No attorney, physician or any other person 
shall issue or cause to be issued any card, sign or device to any person, or 
cause, permit or allow any sign or marking on or in any building or struc-
ture, or announce or cause, permit or allow any announcement to appear, in 
any newspaper, magazine, directory, or on radio or television or advertise 
by any other means that the attorney, physician or other person is available 
to provide assistance. 
w » • • — — — — • — - - •• — — — ' ' • " • ' " " — -
(4) No provision of this act shall preclude payment of fees for medical, 
legal, or other lawful services rendered in connection with the care of a 
mother, delivery and care of a child, or lawful adoption proceedings; nor 
shall any provision of this act abrogate the right of procedures for inde-
1 pendent adoption as provided by law. 
(5) The division of family services or any interested person may com-
mence an action in the district court to enjoin any person, agency, firm, 
corporation or association violating subsections (2) or (3) of this section. 
